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Intergenerational transfers and European families:  




Existing research on intergenerational transfers has focused on income and wealth as 
the predominant determinants of the provision of financial assistance to adult children 
(Albertini, Kohli, and Vogel 2006; Zissimopoulos and Smith 2010; Albertini and Radl 
2012). Yet previous models of intergenerational transfers underestimated the effect of 
family size due to the effect of birth order and inappropriate research design.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
This paper aims to more accurately describe the relationship between family size and 
intergenerational financial transfers in Europe. In developing a more appropriate 
theoretical and empirical understanding of intergenerational behaviour by borrowing 
findings from other areas of family studies, this paper explores the issues involved in 
the complex analysis of cross generational issues such as sampling, diverse and 
complex family forms, and unobserved family- and individual-level heterogeneity.  
 
METHODS 
Using multilevel methods to nest individual children in their extended families, this 
paper analyses data from the Survey for Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, and 
concludes that family size and birth order are essential for understanding 
intergenerational transfers. Logit and Tobit models are used to predict transfer 




The analysis suggests that an only child is more than four times as likely to receive 
financial assistance as someone in a four-child family. This means that the maximum 
effect of family size is more than twice that of parental income. A separate and 
independent effect of birth order is also identified, which suggests that the oldest in a 
four-child family is twice as likely to receive financial assistance as their youngest 
sibling. 
                                                          
1 University of Edinburgh. E-Mail: temery86@gmail.com. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The policy implications of this finding are significant in the context of an ageing society 
and demographic change, suggesting a shift in focus from financial to demographic 
models of intergenerational dependency. The conclusions argue for the use of 
multilevel modelling in the future analysis of intergenerational transfers. Doing so may 
help refocus  intergenerational transfers research onto issues of family structure and 
circumstance, rather than the direct transfer of resources from one generation to the 





The intergenerational literature is extremely well developed, and sits at an important 
juncture between family studies, economics and demographics. Existing research is rich 
and fruitful, and has proved exceptionally insightful over the past 20 years, to the extent 
that we now know a great deal about the supporting role played by the extended family 
throughout the life course (Berry 2008; Cox 1987; Hurd et al. 2007; Attias-Donfut et al. 
2005; Altonji et al. 1997; Albertini, Kohli, and Vogel 2006; Hurd et al. 2007; Albertini 
and Radl 2012; McGarry and Schoeni 1995; Kohli 1999). Yet, intergenerational 
transfers are about families, and in existing analysis the family structure, in terms of 
family size, birth order and variance clustering, is largely absent from the empirical and 
theoretical framework.  
This paper begins by exploring the routes of this neglect, and argues that it is to be 
found in the econometric routes of the analysis. It goes on to argue that this has led to 
bias estimates and an incomplete theoretical comprehension of transfer behaviour. 
Furthermore, using multilevel techniques to analyse data from the Survey for Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), it provides evidence that more accurately 
specified modelling identifies family size as a key determinant of intergenerational 
transfers and subsequent welfare outcomes.  
Family size and birth order have played a crucial role in other areas of family 
studies, such as investment in children and the provision of care for the elderly (Black 
et al. 2005; Voorpostel and Blieszner 2008). Research on intergenerational transfers 
has, however, tended to ignore family size and birth order, due to a lack of multilevel 
methods and a focus on economic variables such as parental income (Cox 1987; Altonji 
et al. 1997; McGarry 1997; Zissimopoulos and Smith 2010). This tendency may be 
distorting the possible inferences regarding social mobility and the interaction between 
the family and the welfare state, which underpin intergenerational transfers’ substantive 
contributions. 
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In order to examine this idea, this paper proceeds as follows. Section two discusses 
family size in the context of existing theories, and offers a strategy for the inclusion of 
siblings within the altruistic model. Section 3 discusses the data to be used, and the 
extent to which the data is capable of representative multilevel analysis. It then 
proceeds to outline the methods to be used in the analysis and the advantage of these 
methods over those previously used.  
Section 4 analyses intergenerational transfer behaviour by comparing single level 
Logit and Tobit analysis of parent-child dyads with multilevel random coefficient Tobit 
and Logit models. Having established their worth, the multilevel models are examined 
in more detail and the effect of family size and birth order are independently scrutinised 
with regard to their effect on transfer behaviour. Section 5 offers a discussion of the 
results and argues that the methodological approach is vindicated and previous bias 
exposed. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of implications, limitations and 
directions for future research.  
 
 
2. Transfers in multi-child families 
2.1 Incorporating more than one child 
Much of the existing research on intergenerational transfers uses an altruistic model 
(McGarry 1997; Zissimopoulos and Smith 2010; Altonji et al. 1997). This suggests that 
parents transfer money due to the altruistic feelings towards their children. Transfers 
increase the wellbeing of the child, which in turn increases the wellbeing of the parent.  
This can be expressed as: 
 
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢 �𝐶𝑝, �𝑉(𝐶𝑘)�� (1) 
 
Where the function is constrained by: 
 
𝐶𝑝 =  𝐼𝑝 − 𝑇 (2) 
 
𝐶𝑘 =  𝐼𝑘 + 𝑇𝑘 (3) 
 
In this model Cp is the consumption of the parent, V is the utility of the children and Ck 
is the consumption of the children. The first equation shows that the parent’s utility is 
determined by their own level of consumption and the utility of the children. The 
children’s utility is in turn determined by their own consumption levels. 2 and 3 are 
constraints where Ip is the income of the parent and Ik is the income of the children. T is 
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the level of transfer from the parent to the children. In this approach the difference 
between small families and large families is the increased ‘demand’ for support and 
therefore large families transfer more.  
However, this approach is limited in its ability to identify the impact of family size 
at the individual level of the child. This is particularly important if any information is to 
be gleaned as to the distribution and impact of intergenerational transfers. Furthermore, 
given that intergenerational transfers represent a study of the family as a welfare-
providing unit, it is counterintuitive to reduce the structural dimensions of the family to 
aggregates (Browning et al. 2010).  
In order to adjust the altruistic model to include more than one child, it is possible 
to simply include a further child within the utility function previously described: 
 
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢 �𝐶𝑝, �𝑉1(𝐶𝑘1),𝑉2(𝐶𝑘2)�� (4) 
 
Where the function is constrained by: 
 
𝐶𝑝 =  𝐼𝑝 − (𝑇1 + 𝑇2) (5) 
 
𝐶𝑘1 =  𝐼𝑘1 + 𝑇𝑘1 (6) 
 
𝐶𝑘2 =  𝐼𝑘2 + 𝑇𝑘2 (7) 
 
Here the suffixes k1 and k2 represent the first and second child, respectively. V 
represents the utility function in relation to each individual child from the perspective of 
the parent but is assumed to be the same for all children. The accuracy of this claim is 
considered later in this section.  
The main drawback here is that the introduction of additional children erodes the 
parsimony for which the altruistic model is valued and this is worsened further if we 
relax the assumption that all children are the same (Becker 1991). This messiness may 
explain the absence of family size in the majority of the existing literature. One aim of 
this paper is to establish whether such additional complexity is necessary. Such 
complexity is only considered necessary if factors at the family level can be seen to 
affect our estimates of transfer behaviour.  
To identify whether this is the case, multilevel models in which parent-child dyads 
are nested within families will be compared to the single level models traditionally 
used. If the coefficients for family size are significantly different in the multilevel 
models, it should be concluded that the parsimonious models currently in use are 
insufficient for understanding transfer behaviour. If family size is a key determinant of 
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transfer behaviour, it suggests that the existing theoretical framework has obstructed a 
view of a key determinant of transfer behaviour. 
If it is assumed that parents care for their children equally, then transfers should 
increase and the total amount transferred by the family should increase with each 
additional child. This is because each child evokes inherent altruism in the parent and a 
subsequent desire to give. Despite this, it should not be expected that transfer behaviour 
would double when an only child is joined by an identical sibling as though there were 
a fixed sized payment made to children. Instead, the rate of increase is inversely 
proportional to the marginal returns to additional consumption for the utility of the 
parent.  
That is to say, as the demands for financial assistance increase with each additional 
child, a parent’s own utility is increasingly impinged upon, and negatively affects the 
extent to which they are willing to transfer additional funds to their children. Therefore, 
aggregate transfer behaviour will increase at a decreasing marginal rate with additional 
children. The extent to which it does will reflect the elasticity of the parents’ own utility 
curve. 
This does not imply that a parent’s affection for their children is diluted with each 
additional child, but merely that to proportionally increase the total amount transferred 
would increasingly impinge upon their quality of life. Therefore, with each child, 
ceteris paribus, there is a decreasing marginal increase in the family’s total transfer 
budget. 
For the original child, who now must share transfers with their sibling, the 
situation will be worse. This can be shown by the fact that the parent’s marginal returns 
on consumption will be positive, and the burden of an additional child will not be met 
with an increase in transfers to the point at which each child’s utility is the same as it 
would be, had it been an only child. Therefore, the altruistic model suggests that if the 
number of children in a family increases, then the amount received by a child will 
necessarily be lower than it would be in a family with fewer children, assuming all 
children are treated equally. 
 
 
2.2 Child order and the number of siblings 
Existing research on intergenerational transfers has only considered the role of family 
size from a limited perspective, by controlling for family size within analysis. At a 
theoretical level, the literature has not fully incorporated the original framework of 
family economic theory to the extent that other areas of family studies, such as early life 
and educational investment, have done. This section draws on this literature to consider 
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the role of birth order, which is currently absent from the analysis of intergenerational 
transfers. 
The idea that children of differing birth order are treated equally has been shown to 
be highly questionable in research on investment in young children (Black et al. 2005). 
It has been demonstrated on numerous occasions that it is birth order and not family 
size that determines the probability that a child will receive financial or emotional 
investment and that therefore older children receive preferential treatment (Booth and 
Hiao 2009). The existing literature on transfers gives no room to considerations of child 
order, which, given that the aforementioned studies found little effect from family size, 
raises interesting questions about the accuracy of existing research on intergenerational 
transfers. 
Empirically, there are high levels of correlation at the individual level between 
child order and family size, as a large family will have more children further down the 
birth order. There are a number of mechanisms that induce less investment in children 
further down the birth order such as the mother being less engaged in the labour market, 
earlier children receiving investment prior to the birth of siblings, and the traditional 
and cultural legacy of disproportional investment in the first born (Åslund and 
Grönqvist 2010).  
There is considerable ambiguity as to whether this birth order effect would carry 
through to later stages in life. Nevertheless, it could be that the first child benefits from 
their siblings having yet to exhibit their own demands on the financial resources of the 
parents (Blake 1981; Coall et al. 2009). Conversely it could be argued that children 
further down the birth order will make a transition to adulthood at a time when the 
parent’s financial resources are more mature, in terms of their labour market and 
housing position (Barber and East 2009). There is a need to account for birth order 
within the theoretical and analytical framework, given that if the probability of 
receiving a transfer does differ by birth order, it will necessarily influence the perceived 
effect of family size. At an empirical level, the strong correlation between birth order 




The reformed altruistic model suggests that the total amount transferred by parents will 
rise with each additional child because each additional child represents a potential 
source of unhappiness for the parent. It is important to note that this increase will not be 
proportional, in that with each additional child, provision of transfers will increasingly 
encroach upon the personal consumption of the parent. The function by which this 
occurs is indicative of the shape of the parent’s indifference curve and the extent to 
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which they are willing to adjust transfer behaviour in response to the demand placed 
upon them by their children (Browning et al. 2010). 
This is in line with traditional ideas of family size and investment capacity and 
therefore is not controversial. The hypothesis to be tested in this paper looks at the 
impact of this behaviour at the individual level: 
 
The probability of any one individual receiving a transfer as well as the size of any 
subsequent transfer are negatively affected by the number of siblings that individual 
has. 
 
This logically follows from the assertion above because, if the aggregate transfer 
amount and frequency rise less than proportionally within the family, an individual 
child’s likelihood of receiving a transfer will decline. This is a more complex assertion 
than it appears, given that the existing literature of related fields suggests that the 
disproportionality is almost entirely carried by children further down the birth order, 
and that, once you control for birth order, the effect of family size disappears (Booth 
and Hiao 2009). A positive finding regarding this hypothesis would therefore 
distinguish intergenerational transfers from the existing literature that has been 
conducted  in other areas of family studies on transfers earlier in the life of the child, 
and suggest that they operate under differing dynamics. 
If the effect of family size on the individual likelihood of receiving transfers is 
evidenced and shown to be of relative importance in relation to established factors, such 
as family income and wealth, it should raise questions about the need to revise and 
extend the altruistic model and pay closer attention to the clustering of variance and 
nesting of individual dyads within family groups. If the hypothesis were refuted, 
however, it would support existing research, which tends to regard family size as a 
marginal variable on the fringes of the model, and something that ultimately does not 
greatly affect the design of research on intergenerational transfers. 
 
 
3. Data & methods 
3.1 Aggregated family level descriptives 
The final sample from the second wave of SHARE in 2006 consists of 15,412 
households from 14 European Countries, in which one of the residents is over 50 and 
has reported that they have living children. The descriptives of the family level 
variables reflect the survey format wherein a specific individual must be identified as 
the financial respondent, and the data of this individual is predominantly used in the 
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analysis. The descriptive statistics in table 1 are coherrent with statistics from Eurostat 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
 
Figure 1: The percentage of children for financial respondents with at least one 
child (Inclusive of step, fosetered and adopted children)– (SHARE 
2006) 
 
Deviations from official statistics on these variables can generally be accounted for 
by the fact that this refers to individuals who have children. So whilst it is true that a 
great deal more than 1.7% of the over 50’s never got married, this proportion is true 
only of those who have had at least one child. Income, wealth and transfer statistics 
reflect the distributions after the exclusion of the top 1% who have been shown to bias 
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Table 1: Family level variables – Variables at the household level for 
respondents in SHARE Wave 2 and the Individual level variables for 
the allocated financial respondent. (SHARE 2006) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household 
 
       
Made a Transfer 23% - - - - 
Total Transferred € 803 € 0 € 2,795 € 0 € 26,846 
Children 2.52 2 1.57 1 16 
Children Selected for Survey 2.34 2 0.96 1 4 
Income (Household) € 42,717 € 20,760 € 73,466 € 0 € 563,758 
Wealth (Household) € 175,326 € 115,000 € 262,893 € 0 € 2,227,247 
Average Age 65.16 63.5 17.14 50 104 
Average Years in Education  10.53 10.5 4.27 0 25 
Financial Respondent          
Gender (ref: female) 46.52% - - - - 
Marital Status      
Married 63.95% - - - - 
Partnership 1.28% - - - - 
Married – Separated 1.86% - - - - 
Never Married 1.7% - - - - 
Divorced 9.03% - - - - 
Widowed 22.17% - - - - 
Employment Status      
Retired 52.04% - - - - 
Employed 27.15%     
Disabled 3.75% - - - - 
Unemployed 2.63% - - - - 
Homemaker 13.54% - - - - 
Observations = 12,104      
 
At the family level, all financial variables are in Euros taken at purchasing power 
parity and these values are then logged to approximate a normal distirbution. This is 
inclusive of income, wealth, inheritance and transfers receipts. There is a potential issue 
in the use of income given that it is considered to correlate with family size. The 
Pearson’s R for this relationship is, however, just -0.032, and so shouldn’t statistically 
constrain the estimates. The ‘wealth’ variable refers to both financial and fixed assets 
held by the family as indicated by the assets section of the SHARE questionnaire2. 
These values only reflect the financial circumstances of the respondent and their spouse 
if they have one. 
In addition to the financial variables, the time variables “Number of Hours Spent 
Babysitting for this child”, “Number of Hours Spent Giving Support for this child” and 
“Number of Hours Spent Receiving Help from this child” were also logged, to 
approximate a normal distirbution and represent an estimated average per-weekly 
                                                          
2 This includes variables: as003e as007e as011e as017e as021e as030e as042e as051e as042e as051e ho027e. 
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amount. These variables are derived from the section of the survey relating to support 
receipt and giving [SP003_ – SP006_]. 
 
 
3.2 The parent-child dyad descriptives 
Table 2: Individual level variables – Variables for the parent-child dyad for 
respondents in SHARE Wave 2. (Variables marked with an asterix 
include all children, those without only include those selected for 
detailed response within the survey) (SHARE 2006) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transfer Occurrence 14.27% - - - - 
Transfer Amount (Total Pop.) € 318 € 0 1490.69 € 0 € 26,846 
Transfer Amount (Recipients Only) € 2,452 € 1,085 3446.38 € 1 € 26,846 
Birth Order* 2.05 2 1.27 1 15 
Gender (Ref: Female)* 50.90% - - - - 
Number of Children 1.08 1 1.24 0 22 
Age* 36.67 36 11.08 0 87 
Parentage          
Child of Respondent Couple 92.17% - - - - 
Child of Financial Respondent Only 4.63% - - - - 
Child of Respondents Partner Only 2.64% - - - - 
Adopted 0.43% - - - - 
Fostered 0.001% - - - - 
Education       
Education (Low – ISCED 1-2) 17.54% - - - - 
Education (Medium – ISCED 3-4) 43.52% - - - - 
Education (High – ISCED 5-6) 27.15% - - - - 
Employment Status       
Employed 67.99% - - - - 
Unemployed 4.49% - - - - 
Self Employed 6.42% - - - - 
Part Time Employment 6.88% - - - - 
In Education 6.42% - - - - 
Parental Leave 1.07% - - - - 
Retired 1.88% - - - - 
Sick or Disabled 1.42% - - - - 
Home Maker 4.67% - - - - 
Observations = 24,966      
 
The descriptives for the parent-child dyad are included within table 2. The 
validation of these values is particularly difficult given that the sample is children of the 
over 50’s rather than directly from the population. 
For example, results for the education variable, which are based upon the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), appear to be out of line 
with the wider population. A low level of education refers to an individual who has 
only reached level 2 or lower on the ISCED scale. In our sample this refers to 17.54% 
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of 25-34 year olds, whilst Eurostat estimates that the value is around 24% in 2006 for 
the EU-15. This suggests that our population of children is substantially different from 
the general population. This discrepancy could exist for a number of reasons, most of 
which relate to the sampling method. 
One reason for this is that children of younger parents are generally less likely to 
succeed in education because younger parents can invest less in their children and are 
more likely to come from disadvantaged backgrounds themselves. These individuals 
will not be included within our sample as they may not yet be the children of an 
individual over 50. A line of very young mothers could imply that only the great 
grandmother and above are eligible for the SHARE sample. This may be causing a 
proportion of the bias. 
A further reason is that it’s possible that this particular variable is biased upward 
because it is the parents who are surveyed and not the children, leading to substantial 
inflation in the child’s achievements. These caveats do raise concerns about what this 
sample of children can tell us and illustrate the complexities of inferring from an 
indirect sample to a wider population.  
Reconstituted families are a further means by which the indirect sampling method 
warps the sample used within this analysis. Here, because of random sampling, each 
unit should be equally likely of selection. When everybody has one mother and one 
father that are equally likely of being sampled by SHARE, then this process should not 
affect the outcome to a noticeable, systematic extent. However once a home is 
reconstituted or split into two, an individual’s chances of being drawn in the sample are 
effectively doubled. The sample above should therefore over sample those individuals 
from reconstituted families.  
 
 
3.3 Birth order and within family sampling 
92.8% of families consist of four children or fewer, which is important because the 
survey only includes details about four children. Therefore, the number of individual 
children who are excluded due to the surveys restriction to four detailed child 
responses, should not pose a problem regarding wider inference.  The correlation 
coefficient between birth order and family size is indeed high (r = 0.63). Yet, contrary 
to expectations, the sampling of four children within large families is fairly evenly 
distributed in spite of the methods employed. For example, the distribution of birth 
order amongst children from a six-child family is as follows: 
 
Birth Position   1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th  
% of Children   19.25  19.35  17.42  17.53  14.52  11.94 
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Here there is a distinct bias toward the older children within this family size but 
that this bias is not excessively large. A child in a six-child family should have a 
16.66% (1 in 6) chance of being selected. The two youngest children are therefore 
slightly underrepresented in the final sample. Figure 2 demonstrates this tendency 
graphically by showing the relative likelihood of sampling by birth order for each 
family size. A value of one reflects the fact that the child is as likely as their siblings to 
be selected. Any value over one suggests that this birth order position is likely to be 
oversampled and values under one reflect the opposite. As one can see, divergences 
from one are not very extreme but do vary by family size and there are some patterns 
within the data. 
 
Figure 2: Relative probability of sampling amongst siblings by birth order 
amongst children of respondents (SHARE 2006) 
 
For families with fewer than seven children, the picture is relatively clear, in that 
the relative likelihood does tail off towards the lower birth orders. This is probably due 






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Birth Order
2 child family 3 child family 4 child family
5 child family 6 child family 7 child family
8 child family 9 child family 10 child family
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This pattern is particularly pronounced in families of more than five children. For larger 
families, the sampling appears to be much more erratic.  
Nevertheless, the correlation between family size and birth order needs to be held 
in consideration within this model, as multi-collinearity is likely to distort the 
coefficient estimates of individual predictors and thus complicate the hypothesis testing. 
In order to establish the effect of multi-collinearity the models were re-run for 
individual birth order groups. The estimates remained stable so the effects in section 4 




In order to test the hypotheses, the data was analysed using four separate statistical 
models. In order to capture two dimensions of ‘transfer behaviour’, the models test both 
the likelihood that a transfer will occur and estimate the size of subsequent transfers. To 
do this, a logistic regression model was used to assess the likelihood that a transfer 
takes place and this was then followed by a Tobit analysis, which was used to estimate 
the size of subsequent transfers. This approach is superior to previous analysis which 
relied on ordinary least square estimates for the estimation of the transfer size. This has 
been shown to systematically produce underestimates of coefficients and affect size 
(Voorpostel and Blieszner 2008; Hox 2010; Brandt et al. 2009).  
The logit model was used to model the likelihood that a transfer will take place. 
The tobit model was used to estimate the size of transfers based on the notion that the 
transfers are left censored at €250 as stated in the SHARE questionnaire (logged this 
produces a value of 5.5214) (Albertini and Radl 2012).   
In constructing the model, a stepwise approach was taken with the exception of the 
key independent variables; number of children and birth order. The completed model 
was then compared to a model that included the number of children and the coefficient 
estimates as well as model fit statistics were used to determine whether the effect was 
significantly different from zero from a statistical and substantive perspective.  
In addition to family level and individual level variables, dummy variables were 
included to capture differences between countries. The country level effects are controls 
and do not reflect a test of the relevant hypothesis. It could be argued that these effects 
themselves are miss-specified, in that they are not described as a third level of fixed 
effects. This would provide a good topic for further research, but given the complexity 
of the estimation process involved and the deviation from the question at hand, it was 
not considered necessary for this analysis. 
In order to establish whether or not a multilevel framework was necessary, two 
random effect multilevel models, one Logit and one Tobit, were used (Rabe-Hesketh 
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and Skrondal 2012). These were then compared with single level versions of these 
models, which are most commonly used in the literature. The Akaike Information 
Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion are used in order to compare the 
models and establish the extent to which the clustering of observations by family 
improved the model fit. It should be noted that the AIC and BIC cannot be compared 
across Logit and Tobit models. 
The main hypothesis was examined by looking at three aspects of the analysis. The 
first is the coefficients standard error and the statistical significance of the estimate. The 
second was the effect size of the ‘family size’ variable and how this compares with 
other variables. Particular attention was also given to the comparison with the effect of 
birth order. These two effects operate at two levels of analysis, yet this model design 
allows for comparisons across these levels, and thus provides estimates and 
interpretations superior to those of previous research. Thirdly, the maximum effects of 
family size were assessed and compared to important variables of a differing metric 
such as income. This was done by examining the maximum effects across the credible 
range of these variables. 
Multiple imputation was run using STATA 12’s inbuilt ‘mi’ command to establish 
whether there were consistent differences in the estimates once missing data had been 
imputed. 20 iterations were used and the estimates approximate well to those of the 
original dataset and therefore the original dataset was used given the diagnostic 




4.1 Is a multilevel model necessary? 
Model 1 in table 3 shows the traditional model used in the analysis, in that it adopts a 
logit model of transfer behaviour to predict whether or not a transfer has occurred. 
Many of the variables used in this analysis are widely used in the literature and the 
estimates are broadly, though not statistically, comparable. The likelihood statistics at 
the bottom of table 4 demonstrate a significant and dramatic improvement in the model 
fit between this model and model 2, the random effects model. This is strong evidence 
that the multilevel approach is an improvement on the analysis of intergenerational 
transfers and allows for more appropriate between family comparisons that are the 
focus of the majority of intergenerational transfers. This finding is supported by the 
comparison of model 3 and model 4, which are a single level and multilevel tobit 
analysis of transfer size respectively.  
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Table 3: Estimates of child and family level coefficients in single and 
multilevel Logit and Tobit models of transfer occurrence and 
transfer size (SHARE 2006) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Logit (OR) 
Multi Level 
Logit (OR) Tobit 
Multi Level 
Tobit 
Child Level                 
Birth Order 0.916 ** 0.782 *** -0.088 * -0.116 *** 
Gender (#Ref: Male) 1.121 ** 1.252 ** 0.107   0.111 *  *  
Number of Children 1.034   1.074   0.066 * 0.061 *   
Childs Lineage, (#Ref:Child of Both) - Financial Respondents 
Child 0.718 *** 0.558 *** -0.455 *** -0.350 **  
Non-Financial Respondents Child 0.673 *** 0.469 *** -0.652 *** -0.556 *** 
Child is Adopted 1.668 ** 2.040   0.698 * 0.476     
Age 0.953 *** 0.869 *** -0.102 *** -0.116 *** 
Age Squared 1.000   1.001 * 0.001 ** 0.001 **  
Marital Status, (#Ref: Married) - Divorced or Separated 1.498 *** 2.196 *** 0.561 *** 0.572 *** 
Never Married 1.345 *** 1.582 *** 0.458 *** 0.318 *** 
Widow 1.475   2.668 ** 0.807 ** 0.834 **  
Employment Status, (#Ref: Full Time) – Unemployed 1.672 *** 2.659 *** 0.681 *** 0.550 *** 
Self Employed 1.011   1.028   0.087   0.069     
Part Time 1.085   1.185   0.116   0.147     
Student 1.687 *** 2.733 *** 0.780 *** 0.704 *** 
Parental Leave 1.130   1.135   0.359   0.249     
Retired 1.182   1.600   0.061   0.248     
Sick or Disabled 1.376   1.841 * 0.362   0.407     
Homemaker 0.965   0.915   -0.040   -0.106     
Parental Level                 
Age of the Parents (Average) 1.005   1.010   0.008   0.007     
Parents Income (Log, Euro) 1.129 *** 1.266 *** 0.216 *** 0.202 *** 
Parents Wealth (Log, Euro) 1.181 *** 1.389 *** 0.296 *** 0.299 *** 
Employment Status, (#Ref: Retired) - Employed or Self-
employed 1.155 ** 1.393 * 0.184 * 0.248 *   
Unemployed 0.882   0.667   0.059   -0.009     
Permanently Sick or Disabled 0.910   0.758   -0.040   -0.027     
Homemaker 0.721 *** 0.506 *** -0.488 *** -0.497 *** 
Years in Education (Average) 1.056 *** 1.130 *** 0.082 *** 0.091 *** 
Total number of Grandchildren 1.008   1.026   0.018   0.022     
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Table 3: (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Logit (OR) 
Multi Level 
Logit (OR) Tobit 
Multi Level 
Tobit 
Parents Household, (#Ref: Couple) – Single 0.796 ** 0.668 * -0.176   -0.140     
Number of residents other than respondent or spouse 0.989   0.941   -0.048   -0.068     
Transfers Received (Log, Euro) 1.126 *** 1.281 *** 0.156 *** 0.154 *** 
Inheritance Received (Log, Euro) 1.053 *** 1.118 *** 0.087 *** 0.086 *** 
Total Number of Children 0.743 *** 0.605 *** -0.414 *** -0.376 *** 
Number of Hours Spent Babysitting for this child’s children(log) 1.037 *** 1.067 *** 0.057 *** 0.044 *** 
Number of Hours Spent Giving Support for this child(log) 1.059 *** 1.106 *** 0.069 ** 0.067 **  
Number of Hours Spent Receiving Help from this child(log) 1.131 *** 1.256 *** 0.142 *** 0.114 *** 
 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OR denotes Odds Ratios. 
 
 
Table 4: Model Fit Statistics for the models in table 3 (SHARE 2006) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Logit (OR) 
Multi Level 
Logit (OR) Tobit 
Multi Level 
Tobit 
lnsig2u                   
Constant     11.821 ***           
sigma                   
Constant         2.76 ***       
sigma_u                   
Constant             2.44 *** 
sigma_e                   
Constant             1.525 *** 
Log Likelihood -10242   -8836   -14959   -13707     
AIC 20583.5   17773.9   30019.6   27518.2     
BIC 20994.5   18193   30438.7   27945.6     
Number of Groups   12,014    12014  
Observations 24,966   24,966   24,966   24,966     
 
Note: p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OR denotes Odds Ratios. 
 
 
4.2 Transfer occurrence on the parent-child dyad 
The parent-child dyad random effects models offer an opportunity to place results in the 
context of the child. Model 2 in table 3 demonstrates that the size of the family one is in 
has a significant and large effect on the probability of receiving a transfer. The 
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coefficient implies that individuals who are an only child are more than 4 times as 
likely to receive a transfer as those in a family of four (table 3, model 2:1/(0.605 3) = 
4.52). This would seem to indicate that the size of an individual’s family plays a large 
role in determining whether or not an individual receives financial assistance from their 
family.  
 
Figure 3: Probability of receiving a transfer by number of children as 
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Figure 4: Probability of receiving a transfer by parent’s logged income as 
estimated by model 2 at mean values (SHARE 2006) 
 
 
When we place this in the context of family income, the size of this effect becomes 
apparent. Someone from a family with an income in the top 10% is not even twice as 
likely to receive a transfer as an individual in the bottom 10% (table 3, model 2: 
1.27log(€5999) – log(€497) = 1.79). The coefficient for income is slightly, though not 
substantially larger than that in model 1 and those estimated by comparable research 
(Albertini and Kohli 2012).  The results for model 2 therefore suggest that the 
maximum effect of family size is more than twice that of income, and that family size 
has thus been under-estimated in its impact (4.52/1.79 = 2.52). The results therefore 
indicate that family size has been neglected in the analysis of intergenerational transfer 
behaviour. Both coefficients are strongly significant at more than the 99.9% level. 
Underestimates of family size have been in part due to the absence of a control for 
birth order. Birth order also has a large and significant effect on the likelihood of 
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oldest is more than twice (table 3, model 2: 1/(0.782 3) = 2.09) as likely to receive a 
transfer as the fourth child. This suggests that there are in fact birth order effects on 
transfer behaviour and these will have biased previous findings regarding the effect of 
family size on transfer behaviour.  
 
 
4.3 Transfer amount on the parent-child dyad 
The multilevel Tobit model also shows a significant effect of family size on the amount 
an individual receives, adding further evidence to the notion that children in larger 
families are disadvantaged in terms of transfers. Similarly they show that there is a 
separate and independent effect of birth order that has been missing in previous 
analysis.  
These results suggest that when we consider the size of transfers in the context of 
the likelihood of a transfer, smaller families make transfers of a substantially greater 
size. The coefficient suggests that with each additional child the size of a transfer 
decreases by 31.33% (table 3, model 4: exp(-0.376) = 0.69), so that an only child will, 
on average, receive more than three times that of someone in a four-child family 
(1/(0.69 3) = 3.04). An OLS estimation was conducted using the same covariates, which 
estimated the decrease, would be just 16.29% (1 - exp( -0.1778)). This illustrates the 
bias prevalent from using OLS. 
We can place the effect of family size in the context of parental income. Here we 
can see that the estimated amount received by a child from a family in the tenth 
percentile of income will be just 65.34% larger than the amount estimated for a child 
from a family in the first percentile (table 3, model 4: exp(0.202*(log(€5999) – 
log(€497))) = 1.65). If we take these to be reasonable maximum effects, then the impact 
of family size appears to be approximately 84% bigger than that of parental income 
(3.04/1.65 = 1.84). 
With regard to birth order, the model suggests that the estimated size of a transfer 
to the oldest child in a four-child family is 41.62% more than that of the youngest child 
(table 3, model 4: 1/(exp(-0.116*3)) = 1.42). The analogous OLS estimate was just 
18.36% (1/exp( -.0562*3)). This suggests that the effect of birth order, whilst 
considerable, is less than that of family size, and it is also only significant at the 95% 
level. This implies that, unlike the case of early life investment, there is a distinct effect 
from family size independent of that implied by birth order alone.  
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
5.1 Findings at the child level 
The results of the parent-child dyad models demonstrate that children in larger 
European families get less financial support. What is surprising is the relative size of 
this effect. In the past decade there have been a considerable number of studies, 
demonstrating that with each additional sibling, the probability of receiving a transfer 
from parents reduces by around 20-22% (Kohli 1999; Leopold and Schneider 2010; 
McGarry and Schoeni 1995; Zissimopoulos and Smith 2010). The results from this 
analysis suggest that the effect on the likelihood of a transfer could be at least twice as 
much as that. 
In terms of maximum effect, existing evidence suggests that an only child is nearly 
three times as likely to receive a transfer as a child in a four-child family (Kohli 1999). 
This analysis concludes that they are more than four times as likely. This discrepancy is 
due to the ability to fully and adequately control for family size within a multilevel 
structure in this analysis. That is to say that family size is at a different analytical level 
to parent-child dyad variables. The resulting models are therefore more accurately 
specified to account for this, as well as the confounding effect of birth order. 
This bias also explains larger coefficient estimates for the multilevel Tobit 
analysis, in which it was shown that the maximum effect of family size was 84% larger 
than that of parental income. In addition to the downward bias generated by the use of 
single level models in previous studies, there is also likely to be a significant downward 
bias with regard to the use of ordinary least-squares models. Therefore McGarry and 
Schoeni’s (1995) estimate, that with each additional sibling a child will receive around 
$47 less, is likely to be a substantial underestimate. 
Due to this underestimation, existing theories and evidence have tended to over 
emphasise the effect of income and downplay the role of family size (Cox 1987). The 
findings here go some way to correcting this and revealing the true effect of family size 
on transfer behaviour. Nevertheless the conclusions are based on a single survey. 
Replication of the analysis with alternative datasets would allow for a more rigorous 
test of these conclusions. However such datasets are rare, given that such data must 
have comprehensive data on all children in the family. Analysis on data from outside of 
Europe would also allow for the external validity of the results to be considered. 
Together, the results of these models do suggest that accounting for the nesting of 
parent-child dyads within families is of great importance. They highlight the need for 
appropriate techniques and analytical approaches in assessing transfers from the 
recipient’s perspective. The inclusion of birth order, the nesting of dyads within family 
contexts, and the use of appropriate estimating techniques uncover a misdirection 
within existing research on transfer behaviour. The substantive implications of this field 
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lie largely in assessing behaviour at the level of the parent-child dyad. Adequately 




5.2 Theoretical implications 
This paper has demonstrated that the altruistic model not only ignores an important 
determinant of transfer behaviour but also leads to bias and misleading empirical 
analysis. It demonstrates that the size of an individual’s family does affect their transfer 
receipts and, more significantly, that correctly specifying and modelling the nature and 
structure of the family is a prerequisite to understanding transfer behaviour more 
generally. 
Existing research has modelled data on transfers at a single level, regardless of 
whether the parent-child dyad or parental household has been the unit of analysis. This 
has led to significant distortions in the estimates produced. Given the high degree of 
between family variance evident within the data, it is likely that this would have led to 
misleading findings both empirically and theoretically. In addition to this, the modelling 
of transfer size using ordinary least square estimates has also persistently led to bias 
estimates. In conclusion, this analysis suggests that theories of intergenerational 
transfers need to incorporate the context of transfer behaviour in a more compelling and 
meaningful way. This paper included attempts to incorporate multiple children into the 
altruistic model. Other theories should be similarly mindful of the need to incorporate 
family structure within their description of transfer behaviour. 
 
 
5.3 Substantive implications 
As an abstract topic of questionable importance, the analysis of intergenerational 
transfers should aim to make a substantive contribution. The topic lends itself to 
discussions of social mobility, youth transitions and many other outcomes of the 
recipient. The analysis offered here looks to support that. In doing so there are few 
topics of greater importance in the social sciences than social mobility (European 
Commision 2011). If intergenerational transfers can offer a genuine contribution to this 
literature and illuminate underlying processes, then it will have vindicated the academic 
attention it has attracted. Yet much of the research in this area has focused on the direct 
transmission of wealth through transfers, and ignored the role of family size and other 
between family differences. This analysis represents a small step toward rectifying this.  
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Demographic arguments in development have often argued that lower fertility 
rates encourage investment in children and subsequent productivity growth (Szreter 
1996; Becker and Tomes 1976). Many of these arguments have suggested that fertility 
declines have led to large productivity gains and industrial revolutions. Others have 
suggested that they preserve existing social strata. They all argue that family size is 
correlated with the child’s outcomes in terms of social and economic advancement. 
This analysis has begun to argue the same using intergenerational transfers as its point 
of departure. 
The evidence offered here suggests a great deal of heterogeneity in transfer 
behaviour that could imply a great deal of heterogeneity in the access to sources of 
welfare. Yet the substantive relevance of this debate and the subsequent revisions 
offered to this model are entirely dependent upon whether or not the extended family is 
a significant source of support for individuals in contemporary Europe. This should 
provide the focus of future research. If this can be shown to be true, however, it will be 
clear that this analysis will not only explain divergent outcomes at an individual level 




5.4 Future research 
Existing social policy designs rarely account for the presence of an extended family and 
the heterogeneity of the strength of such a network. Liberalism has determined that an 
individual over 18 years old is an independent individual. This analysis has 
demonstrated that this is truer for some individuals than others. What’s more, 
traditionally the extent to which extended family members are able to assist an 
individual has been seen to be determined by the amount of money a family has. 
However, the results of this analysis indicate that this is only half the story, and that a 
predictor of equal and often greater validity is the size of that extended family. 
The impact of transfers upon outcomes for individuals will therefore be dependent 
not just upon the financial position of the family but also its size and the relative 
position of the individual within it. The policy implications of this are vast. In modern 
welfare states, children of all ages are targeted due to their family’s financial 
background. This analysis supports the idea that this should only be one trigger of 
welfare. By incorporating family size into such targeting practices, welfare states will 
become more effective in reaching those who need additional support and welfare 
provision. 
In addition to this, the differences due to family size and birth order are indicative 
of whether an individual receives financial support. It is therefore possible that 
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processes preventing meritocratic social mobility could be developed out of a better 
understanding of family support dynamics such as those evidenced within this paper. 
This model can also be stretched further and is capable of exploring many of the 
dynamics involving multi-child families, such as how the welfare of one’s siblings 
affects the likelihood that you yourself will receive financial support, the role of step-
families in family dynamics, the effects of birth spacing, prolonged cohabitation, and 
sandwich generation effects. These are topics that are of great importance in family 
economics and sociology and carry practical policy implications. Yet they were not the 
focus of this study, which instead merely focused on how family size should be 
considered within the context of intergenerational transfers. 
Furthermore, the analysis provided here is limited by the data currently available. 
Multiple waves of data will allow for three level models with more clinical distinctions 
between parent-child and family effects. This will also allow for a full and adequate 
testing of the role of events such as childbirths, graduations, marriages and divorces in 
the cause of financial transfers. Only when this longitudinal element of transfers is 
considered will a full and substantively useful picture emerge. Yet this research does 
suggest that such behaviour will further dilute the fixation on income effects. A final 
limitation is that the data is only for Europe. Whilst the methodological assertions put 
forward in this paper are not geographically limited, the findings of an effect certainly 
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Appendix 
Table 5: Country level effects for the analytical models in table 3 (SHARE 
2006) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Logit (OR) 
Multi Level Logit 
(OR) Tobit Multi Level Tobit 
Country Level                 
(#Ref: Austria) - Germany 0.854   0.700   -0.191   -0.193     
Sweden 0.909   0.694   -0.338 * -0.518 *** 
Netherlands 0.598 *** 0.276 *** -0.765 ** -0.962 *** 
Spain 0.363 *** 0.105 *** -1.763 *** -1.914 *** 
Italy 0.932   0.734   -0.115   -0.233     
France 0.569 *** 0.232 *** -0.999 *** -1.204 *** 
Denmark 0.696 *** 0.390 ** -0.467 ** -0.679 *** 
Greece 0.754 * 0.535 * -0.270   -0.288     
Switzerland 0.463 *** 0.155 *** -1.039 *** -1.241 *** 
Belgium 0.501 *** 0.182 *** -1.178 *** -1.411 *** 
Czechia 0.990   0.738   -1.193 *** -1.354 *** 
Poland 0.894   0.695   -0.652 *** -0.790 *** 
Ireland 0.445 *** 0.178 *** -1.260 *** -1.260 *** 
Constant 1.832   7.741 ** 6.258 *** 6.576 *** 
Log Likelihood -10242   -8836   -14959   -13707     
AIC 20583.5   17773.9   30019.6   27518.2     
BIC 20994.5   18193   30438.7   27945.6     
Observations  24,966    24,966    24,966    24,966     
 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OR denotes Odds Ratios. 
 
